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'The progress of human society consists . . . in . . . the
better and better apportioning of wages to work."u
. INTRODUCTION
It would be a vast understatement to say organized labor is merely aware
of the recent tidal wave of conglomerate mergers that has swept the American
business scene. Its concern is deep and founded on what labor feels is the
best of reasons, its self-interest. The concern over conglomerates is graph-
ically demonstrated by a casual survey of the recent literature published by
organized labor. One finds such titles as: "The Conglomerate: Corporate
Octopus,' 2 "Bargaining With an Octopus," 3 "A Merger of All Industry In
One Vast Corporation?," 4 and "The Merger Threat."
Historically no one voice has spoken for labor. It is generally conceded
that the development of labor cannot be characterized as one of uniformity
and cohesiveness. 6 On any single subject it is difficult to determine with
exactitude the opinion of organized labor. One can draw only general con-
clusions from specific statements of labor leaders and articles in various
labor publications.
This comment is directed to such an appraisal of organized labor's attitude
toward the conglomerate merger and the new aspects of management that
the conglomerate creates. An attempt will be made to resolve the problems
that change inevitably creates by analyzing the effects on labor-management
relations the conglomerate corporation portends. Should conglomerate man-
agement be countered by conglomerate unions?
I1. LA3oR's OPINION EXPLORED
The following is an excerpt from a statement made by Einar 0. Mohn,
I T. CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT 25 (R.D. Atlick ed. 1965).
2 MacDonald, The Conglomerate: Corporate Octopus, AFL-CIO AmERICAN FEDER-
ATIONIST, Feb., 1969, at 17.
3 Goodfader, Bargaining with an Octopus, IUD (Industrial Union Department)
AGENDA, Jan., 1967, at 27.
4 Labor, Sept. 30, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
5 United Paper, Aug., 1968, at 2, col. 1.
6 The IUD AGENDA, an AFL-CIO publication, recently described labor's past history
as being characterized by "long-time rivalries and suspicions among unions, factors
which were sometimes as divisive as the best efforts of the corporation." Conway,
Coordinated Bargaining. . . 'Historical Necessity,' IUD AGENDA, Jan.-Feb., 1968, at 22.
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Vice President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Director
of the Teamsters' Western Conference. It was issued as an expression of the
Teamster attitude toward conglomerate mergers and seems representative
of the general reaction of organized labor toward conglomerates:
While it does not oppose industrial conglomerates the Teamsters Union recognizes
that they pose many challenging problems both to unions representing the workers
involved and to appropriate agencies of the federal government.
Any amalgamation of several companies by one corporate interest, even though
individual company identities may be retained, is bound to be disruptive to
the accustomed manner in which a union now bargains for workers in a specific
industry. Such acquisitons or consolidations also are certain to involve the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and the National Mediation Board, requiring altera-
tions in their procedures in determining bargaining units, proper jurisdictions, and
the adjudication of unfair labor practice cases.
Also, each of these unions would bring under the conglomerate tent contracts
that differ in many respects .... Solving the multiplicity of problems incubated
by such a conglomerate could be a monumental task.
1
It is significant that Mohn's statement does not reflect diametrical oppo-
sition to conglomerates. A conglomerate merger actually could benefit union
activity. A company, for example, with a tradition of resisting unionization
could be acquired by a conglomerate with a more liberal labor policy.
With that management not being hostile to organized labor, the corporation
could be unionized and, clearly, no union could object to such an acquisition.
Mohn's statement seems representative of labor's general belief that con-
glomerate management will not likely conform to the present collective
bargaining structure. Labor views the conglomerate as a threat because
it presents a management form with which labor has had no experience.
The collective bargaining system was developed within the framework of
traditional forms of labor and management. Reciprocal relationships have
developed based on these forms. It is believed that if these relationships
were changed, it could have an impact on the delicate balance of collective
bargaining power. Rather than lose any bargaining power because of an
advantage created by management through bargaining in an untraditional
form, labor insists on changes in the system.
I. W. Abel, President of United Steel Workers, stated that "if this
phenomenon [of conglomerate merger] continues unregulated by the courts
or by new legislation . . . and if merging of large corporations results in
substantive changes in the corporate system, it may well be that our labor
policy will have to be revised."8
7 Statement by Einar 0. Mohn, issued in Burlingame, California, Oct. 17, 1969.
8 Address by I.W. Abel, Association of American Editorial Cartoonists Annual
Convention, in Washington D.C., May, 1968, as reported in Steel Labor, June, 1968,
at 9, col. 1.
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II. NEw ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENT
A. Diversification and the deep pocket
A conglomerate is more than a corporation that has grown in size. The
essential difference between bigness and conglomeration was expressed be-
fore the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee by Dr. Walter Adams,
Professor of Economics, Michigan State University. He said:
A conglomerate giant is powerful, therefore, not because it has monopoly or
oligopoly control over a particular market, but because its resources . . . are
diversified over many different markets.9
Dr. Adams cited Textron, Inc., as an example. Textron began in 1928
as Franklin Rayon Corporation. Presently, Textron has twenty-seven sep-
arate divisions and 113 separate plants. It operates in such dissimilar mar-
kets as helicopters, chicken feed, chain saws, mailboxes, portable space
heaters, workshoes, lawnmowers, paints and varnishes, optical machinery,
bathroom accessories, radar antennas and cast iron cookware.' 0 It could be
described, depending on your point of view towards conglomerates, as
either an octopus with tentacles reaching into many markets, or a building
with a broad foundation.
Conglomerate diversification into multiple markets produces many of the
new aspects of management that affect labor relations. Traditionally, labor
unions are craft oriented. A machinist union, for example, generally would
not represent chemical workers. Again, using Textron as an example, its
organized workers are represented by thirteen separate international unions."'
Textron would have, as a result, multiple labor contracts. In terms of collec-
tive bargaining this is an integral factor.
In collective bargaining, labor pressures management with a threat of
strike. In theory, when there is a strike management loses income. But
notwithstanding the loss of income, management must also meet overhead
costs such as taxes, interest on loans, salaries of non-striking workers,
and the costs of repair and maintenance of the means of production.
Similarly, certain pressure will bear on the union to negotiate a settlement
because the striking workers also have obligations to meet. In the optimum
situation, these pressures would place management and labor in an equal
bargaining position.
12
9 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th & 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess,, pt. 1,
at 249 (1964-66).
10 Id.
11 Portrait of a Few Conglomerate Companies, IUD AGENDA, July, 1967, at 9.
12 It should be recognized, however, that in each specific collective bargaining situa-
tion the economic pressure to settle may not be equal for both sides. One function of a
union is to prepare a strike fund to increase its bargaining position. Similarly, wise
management dictates some economic preparation or warehouse supply of goods to in-
crease its bargaining position. As a result, one side may have made better preparation
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The situation is different, however, for a conglomerate. When a con-
glomerate has labor problems in one segment of production, the other areas
could well remain untouched because of the normally defined jurisdiction of
labor unions. Thus if Textron had labor difficulties at its shoe factory, it is
unlikely that the shoe union could effect a strike at Textron's feed plant.'
8
If the shoe workers struck, the labor union would fear that the shoe division
could be subsidized by another division of the parent conglomerate. Al-
though such a subsidization is not easily implemented into practice, there
still remains the inescapable conclusion that subsidization could ultimately
fortify resistance to the shoe union. Precisely because Textron is in diverse
areas of production, the pressure a union could bring to bear with a strike
on only one division might have little effect on the overall profit picture.14
If, instead of a conglomerate Textron were solely a shoe producer, a strike
by the shoemakers union could very easily bring more effective pressure to
bear upon management by closing down the only source of profit pro-
duction.
The secondary boycott section of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)'5 is the primary reason a union in one segment of production can-
not increase pressure on management by striking other segments of the
conglomerate. The labor fears of a diversified conglomerate are made
less compelling, however, by the restrictive scope of the secondary boycott
rule.
The right to picket wholly-owned subsidiaries has been held to not be
within the purview of the NLRA.16 However, this may not always be help-
ful when dealing with conglomerates. James Ling, in discussing the struc-
ture of Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), stated that conglomerates do not have
to wholly own their subsidiaries. In fact, according to Ling, it is not de-
sirable to be a sole owner.'7 LTV, accordingly, "spins off" a minority in-
terest in its subsidiary corporations to get fluid investment capital. Further-
more, a subsidiary which is not wholly-owned can be struck if there is
than the other and be under less economic pressure to reach a labor settlement.
13 Even if the union legally had the power to call a strike, it is questionable that
they would have the means to persuade members of a different union to leave their
jobs and strike so that the shoe union could increase its bargaining power. Further,
the union's ability to call strikes at other subsidiaries is limited by the National Labor
Relations Act prohibition of secondary boycotts.
14 This is, of course, assuming that shoe production is not a major item in Textron's
overall production. It is possible that effective pressure could be brought if shoe
production represented 10% of Textron's profits. The shoe union, however, would
find its bargaining position much weaker if Textron's shoe division produced less than
1% of the overall profits, or no profit at all.
15 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
16 Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960); Madden v.
Teamsters Local 743, 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,708 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
17 McDonald, Some Candid Answers from James J. Ling, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1969,
at 95.
1970]
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
common ownership and management of the primary and subsidiary com-
panies, and if there is a transfer of work from the struck division to the
subsidiary.18
It has not yet been determined whether the transfer of funds at less than
an arms length loan, from a company to a struck subsidiary would establish
the same relationship as the transfer of struck work. It is difficult, however,
to see any difference between the two situations. If the transfer of work
establishes a close enough relationship to make what normally would be
an illegal secondary strike a legal primary strike, it seems ludicrous to con-
tend that just as close a relation is not created by an artificial transfer of
funds. In Teamsters Local 807,19 the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) established that the dividing line between a legal primary and an
illegal secondary strike is not a rigid line; rather, it depends upon the facts
of each case. If the transfer of struck work ties what normally would be
an unrelated subsidiary to another subsidiary's labor dispute, a subsidiary
that gives funds to another subsidiary so that it can pay its expenses during a
strike seemingly should also be treated as a part of the total labor dispute.
Therefore, if a union striking one subsidiary of a conglomerate can establish
an artificial transfer of funds from other segments of the conglomerate,
it conceivably may not be restrained by the secondary boycott provisions
of the NLRA from increasing its pressure on the conglomerate by picketing
those segments.
B. The impersonal giants
Another aspect of management that the conglomerate embodies is the pos-
sibility of uncontrollable size. This stems from the diversified nature of the
conglomerate. If Textron remained in one specialized area of production,
its growth would be limited by the federal antitrust laws. As an illustration,
if Textron decided to produce only shoes, and as a result acquired only
other shoe manufacturers or expanded by internal growth, it eventually
would become subject to the antitrust laws.
20
Conglomerate growth differs, however, because their external acquisitions
are from diverse areas of goods and services. Thus it is feared that con-
glomerates will not fall within the present antitrust laws. The Wall Street
Journal quoted a,
18 Roumell v. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen, Local 46, 43 CCH Lab. Cas.
25,516 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir.
1959); J.G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958); Schauffler v.
District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. 95,737
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Alpert v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 143 F. Supp. 371 (D.
Mass. 1956).
19 Teamsters Local 807, 90 N.L.R.B. 41 (1950).
20 See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964); Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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'Washington lawyer who's an expert in antitrust cases as claiming that under
present laws federal agencies can't do much about halting the conglomerate
mergers; they can only proceed against consolidations of competing companies.
Bigness alone is not ilegal.' 21
Referring to LTV's acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel, I.W. Abel re-
marked: "This is believed to be the largest cash offer for any company's
stock in history-$425 million. Just for comparison with that $425 million
the net worth of the Steelworkers is about $21 million, and that includes the
kitchen sink."' 22  While Abers implication that labor should have nearly
equal assets to those of management is probably no more than propaganda,
as a result of conglomerate merger, labor might be faced with management of
unprecedented growth potential. This has presented labor with the problem
of dealing with what they consider to be, "impersonal giants, empires of fi-
nance and and manipulation .... -23
Labor has reacted strongly to this new aspect of management created by
the conglomerate. I.W. Abel again was a spokesman for labor in a letter
to the Federal Trade Commission opposing a merger between Peab6dy Coal
Company and Kennecott Copper Corporation. He said:
The merger of a giant copper company and a giant coal company conjures up
possibilities of financial manipulations with the vitality of the communities and
lives of its residents as mere pawns in corporate power moves.
2 4
Labor's reation to the prospect of "impersonal giantism" has frequently
been emotional. A recent issue of a labor newspaper referred to con-
glomerates as:
a shark that profitably gobbles up smaller fish in the industrial world-is unre-
sponsive to every responsibility except that of profit. Work force security, product
quality, market stability, free enterprise competitiveness-all are meaningless to
the appetite of the conglomerate shark.2 5
C. Removal of bargaining authority
A problem which frequently confronts labor is the removal of labor
policy-making power from a local plant. This problem is compounded by
a conglomerate structure. Labor fears the situation in which labor policy
is potentially made in conglomerate headquarter offices before the commence-
ment of local plant bargaining. Labor at each plant, therefore, would be
bargaining with local management already locked into a series of guidelines
from which they could not deviate. 26 This would leave "union officials acting
21 Labor, Sept. 30, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
22 Steel Labor, June, 1968, at 9, col. 2.
23 Labor, Feb. 17, 1968, at 3, cols. 6-7.
24 B.N.A. ANTrRUSr & TRADE REG. REP. No. 341, at A-15 (Jan. 23, 1968).
25 Oil, Chem. and Atomic Union News, Aug., 1969, at 12, col. 1-2.
26 This problem may have arisen in the 1965 bargaining between the Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers Local 876 and Caroline Farms Division of Textron,
Inc. [163 N.L.R.B. 854 (1967)]. Negotiations begun on July 9, 1965 were ter-
mhinted on September 14, 1965 when Local 876 struck Caroline Farms. On Sep-
1970]
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in a vacuum and unable to contact those who could negotiate meaning-
fully.," 27
Although local labor policy making can be removed in any corporate-
labor negotiation, there is greater likelihood that a conglomerate will resort
to this device. In negotiating with conglomerates, the union cannot legally
draw bargaining power from partially owned subsidaries that it does not
represent. Management, on the other hand, can draw strength from all its
divisions.
In spite of the good faith bargaining requirements of the NLRA,2 it is
generally acknowledged that for years General Electric (G.E.)20 has used
tember 23, 1965, the strike ended upon the parties formulation of a preliminary agree-
ment on all substantive items. Before this agreement could be formalized, however, a
new principal negotiator entered the bargaining for Caroline Farms. Upon his appear-
ance, Caroline Farms, in effect, repudiated the agreement. The NLRB Trial Examiner
determined:
[T]hat except for the technical drawing of a collective bargaining agreement
negotiations were practically complete. It was only the disappearance of. . . the
attorney who had been leading negotiations for [Caroline Farms], and the
entrance of [the new principal negotiator] upon the scene, that caused the erasure
of all prior negotiating efforts and results from the blackboard. Id. at 862.
The NLRB held Caroline Farms had violated Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA [28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1964)] by failing to bargain in good faith. Al-
though not considered by the NLRB, this situation might well have been caused by
Textron's abuse of its inherent conglomerate power. One can surmise at least
two possibilities of conglomerate interference with local bargaining. The more overt
likelihood is that the sudden change in Caroline Farm's position was caused by the ar-
rival of the new principal negotiator with a new labor policy dictated in Textron's central
office. As a less patent avenue of conglomerate interference, there exists the possi-
bility that the new principal negotiator's sudden appearance resulted from a shift of
labor negotiating personnel within Textron's internal structure. Consequently, the
new principal negotiator might have had a different concept of a proper labor con-
tract at Caroline Farms. Furthermore, as an outsider, he may have lacked familiarity
with the conditions at Caroline Farms.
Another possibility is that the new principal negotiator's sole negotiation experience
might have been in a part of the country (such as the South, as was the case here)
where a labor contract similar to Caroline Farm's preliminary agreement would have
been unreasonable.
These suppositions illustrate the manner in which a conglomerate could affect labor
negotiations at the local level. Without a conglomerate structure it might be
alleged that Caroline Farms would not have changed principal negotiators in the
midst of negotiations. Further, in the absence of other instructions it is also unlikely
that if such a change were made that the new principal negotiator would find the pre-
liminary labor agreement so distasteful that it would require repudiation. Conglomerate
ownership may enhance the possibility of sudden change in bargaining personnel and
increase the possibility of radical and sudden change in the subsidiary's position towards
labor.
27 Goodfader, supra note 3, at 28.
28 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
29 Although G.E. is not generally regarded as a conglomerate, its conduct in these
labor negotiations graphically illustrates the potential for abuse in removing policy
determinations from the local level. The writer's research has yielded no similar situa-
tions involving more typical conglomerates so strikingly illustrative of this result.
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a set of uniform standards for collective bargaining at its local plants.8"
While it is not clear that the G.E. bargaining teams were locked in and thereby
unable to deviate from this policy, such a posture could be very difficult
to factually establish. Each of the G.E. negotiators could be informally
locked in. For example, each G.E. negotiator would know that the same
labor policy had been presented to every other G.E. negotiator. The ne-
gotiator also would recognize that his success or failure would be measured
by how closely his labor contract coincides with the established guidelines.
As a result, his negotiations might not involve a good faith effort to bargain
with just one union at one plant, but may become an attempt to force a
local union to accept a national labor policy that may have no good faith
application to that union or that plant.
A labor source stated:
More and more, as big companies swallowed up little companies, as corporations
sought to spread their activities over more and more diverse fields, and as man-
agement became centralized ever higher in the corporate chain of command, it
became harder and harder for union negotiators to entice responsible manage-
ment to the bargaining table.
Unions at the plant level often found they were dealing with messengers, who had
to refer decisions 'upstairs,' and these stairs were closed to labor.8 1
Unions also see valuable interpersonal relationships threatened by con-
glomerate takeovers. Over the years stewards and local labor officers estab-
lish working relations with their company supervisors. Labor representatives
can more easily bargain with management supervisors who have personal
knowledge of the needs of the workers in the local plant. After a con-
glomerate takeover labor could be bargaining with unknown men from an
unknown corporation. While it is true that old friends were once new
strangers and therefore this labor fear may not always be valid, in a con-
glomerate takeover there is often a complete change in the personnel of the
management bargaining team. On the other hand, within a traditional
company the introduction of new personnel to the bargaining team would not
be on a complete scale and some uniformity of personnel would likely
be maintained.
In summation, with conglomerates, labor is presented with the possibility
of true management being distant from the bargaining table. It is also
possible, notwithstanding the NLRA, that the representative of management
could be burdened with an overall labor policy, created in the offices of the
conglomerate, from which he could not deviate.
30 INTERNATIONAL LABOR PRESS Ass'N, COORDINATED BARGAINING 5 (pamphlet); see
also Trial Examiner's Decision at 7, General Elec. Co., Case No. 2-CA-10,991 (Oct.
23, 1968) (173 N.L.R.B. No. 46); General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 518
(2d Cir. 1969).
31 Goodfader, supra note 3, at 29.
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IV. WHAT EFFECT ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING
RELATIONS SHOULD CONGLOMERATE MANAGEMENT HAVE?
A. Countervailing power
"Collective bargaining is primarily a pressure game."832 In the American
concept of labor-management relations, both sides have distinct bargaining
powers. The union can withhold labor by striking. Management, subject
to restrictions, can withhold employment through lockouts.83  Theoretically,
under this system, both sides will have to compromise and "justice" of sorts
will have been accomplished. This is the labor market equivalent of the
consumer market concept of countervailing power. 34 According to this
concept, in a smoothly running exchange market, both the seller of either
labor or goods and the consumer of either labor or goods should possess
equal power. While serious doubts have been raised as to whether this is a
valid concept for protecting the best interest of the public, 0 both labor
and management publications indicate fear of increased leverage on the other
side creating an imbalance of power. One management publication said:
[Tihe growing power of large labor unions has upset the equality of bargaining
leverage, which is an essential element of free collective bargaining. Bargaining
can hardly take place when unions can virtually dictate settlement terms... 80
It is also clear that labor has a similar concern over conglomerate managerial
power. I. W. Abel told a recent Industrial Union Department convention:
Effective collective bargaining, realistic collective bargaining, depends upon some
semblance of equality at the bargaining table. There has been a growing con-
centration of corporate wealth, as signified in the creation and growth of con-
glomerates. And I say that this constitutes a real threat to the collective bar-
gaining process. It does so because it tilts the balance scales in favor of
industry.37
32 G. STOCKING, WoRx"LE COMPETITION AND ANa-usr PoucY 6 (1961).
33 Management can employ the lockout device under three conditions: 1) to
prevent unusual economic hardship, 2) to counter union whipsawing tactics, and
3) to use as an offensive weapon after an impasse has been reached in bargaining.
See generally BNA LAn. REL. REP. at LRX 531 (1966).
34 See generally J.K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPIAsmSM: THE CONCEPT OF COUN-
TERVAILING POWER (1952); Galbraith, Countervailing Power, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(Papers & Proceedings 1954).
35 Sitgler, The Economist Plays with Blocks, 44 AM. ECON. Rnv. 7 (Papers & Pro-
ceedings 1954); Miller, Competition and Countervailing Power: Their Roles in the
American Economy, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15 (Papers & Proceedings 1954).
36 G. FARMER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TRANSITION 9-10 (1967). This is classified
as a management publication as it is published by the Industrial Relations Counselors,
Inc., which is composed mainly of corporate executives. Among the members of the
board of trustees are the chairman and vice chairman of Armco Steel Corp., a director
of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., a Westinghouse vice president, the president of
Mobil Oil Corp. and the president of B.F. Goodrich Co. Again, it is cautioned that no
one voice speaks the opinion of management and that this is offered only as a repre-
sentative statement.
87 1 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 72:151 (Oct. 6, 1969).
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Abel seems to believe the solution to the asserted imbalance of power cre-
ated by the conglomerate merger is inter-union cooperation. According to
Abel, in self-defense the unions may have to adopt "'sweeping structural
reform' resulting in conglomerate unions." 38  The Industrial Union Depart-
ment of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. as a result, was organized to coordinate the
cooperation or conglomeration of unions. The vehicle of this change is
what the Industrial Union Department calls "coordinated bargaining".
B. The case for coordinated collective bargaining
Coordinated bargaining, according to an Industrial Union Department
publication, would bring together the unions representing the organized
workers of a conglomerate to compare information on problems of mutual
concern. "Then, ideally, these unions work together on contract negotiations
to ensure the greatest possible use of their combined knowledge and num-
bers."3
0
Through the exchange of information, the Industrial Union Department
would hope to ascertain and then prevent a conglomerate, which bargains
with many unions, from battering down the resistance of the weakest union
and thereby obtain terms that become a pattern for settlement with all other
unions.40
Organized labor claims G.E. has long taken advantage of a labor com-
munication gap:
At contract time, scores of separate negotiations were carried on in cities from
coast to coast. Management spokesmen . . . reported in detail to New York
after each bargaining session. All GE locations are connected by the finest
teletype network money can buy. Union negotiators, in contrast, were totally
isolated. They not only were uninformed about the progress of talks elsewhere;
they were seldom aware that the other meetings were being held.
GE combined its total communications dominance with its knowledge of union
rivalries to achieve contracts which, in effect, represented the minimum terms
that the weakest union local would accept. This divide-and-conquer technique
was effectively applied even among local unions of the same international.
41
A second aspect of coordinated bargaining, that of working together on
contract negotiatons, would enable all unions within a conglomerate to form
a common bargaining front. This would allow all individual unions to deal
with a conglomerate on an equal basis.42
Management has resisted the use of coordinated collective bargaining.4
The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (O.C.A.W.), in
88 Id.
39 Goodfader, supra note 3, at 28.
40 Conway, supra note 6, at 22.
41 COORDiNATED BARGAInaNG, supra note 30, at 5-6; see also General Elec. Co.,
1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417, 25,418 (173 N.L.R.B. No. 46).
42 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Union News, supra note 25, at col. 5.
43 This was indicated by the bargaining between G.E. and the I.U.E. in General
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negotiations with Union Carbide,44 attempted to use coordinated collective
bargaining. The O.C.A.W., in connection with these negotiations, asserted
that management opposed coordinated bargaining because it wished to keep
the unions large in number and divided in power. Management, it claimed,
had always wanted to bargain with the largest number of units possible;
the ideal being bargaining with each worker individually as it does when
there are no unions.4
5
C. The case against coordinated collective bargaining
Union Carbide disagreed with the O.C.A.W. analysis. It stated, in effect,
that the coordinated bargaining plan was nothing more than an attempt to
increase the power of national unions at the expense of local unions.
This is pure propaganda-designed to persuade the local plant union members
to surrender their right to make a personal decision to a few key union officers-
to the aggrandizement of International unions' and IUD's bargaining power.40
The Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., a pro-management organiza-
tion, has published a monograph which has described coordinated collective
bargaining as "national crisis bargaining. '47  The monograph stated that
coordinated collective bargaining would create such an imbalance of power
that the union would no longer have any incentive to compromise. National
strikes were foreseen which could, at the expense of the public, cripple a
nationwide company with the ultimate result being the extraction of in-
flationary wage increases as the only price of labor peace.48
The G.E. situation was cited as an example. As management states
the case, in 1966, G.E.'s 150 locals, affiliated with eight different interna-
tionals, were organized by the Industrial Union Department for coordinated
collective bargaining. This coalition represented half of G.E.'s 190,000
employees. The coalition's stated goals of profit sharing and raising G.E.'s
wages and benefits to a parity with the rest of the industry, were conceded to
be "laudable and traditional trade union goals."' 40
What was new was the organization of a power bloc to wrest concessions from
GE . . . through the use of the combined ability of all of the unions to create
a strike emergency, national in scope, whose terminal and deciding point would
Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417 (173 N.L.R.B. No. 46), enforced, 412
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
44 Union Carbide is a diversified corporation with interests in batteries, anti-freeze,
aero-space and metals among other goods.
45 OIL, CHEM. & ATOMIC WORKERS INT'L UNION, UNION CARBIDE BLACK PAPER
(Feb., 1968) (pamphlet).
46 Address by R. L. Engle, Asst. Dir. of Indus. Relations, Union Carbide, before
American Pension Conference, in New York City, Oct. 25, 1967 in UNION CARIDE
BLACK PAPER, supra note 45, at 10.
47 G. FARMER, supra note 36, at 31.
48 Id. at 18.
49 Id. at 25-26.
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be at the White House.50
G.E. refused to meet with the coalition committee and insisted on the
right to bargain with the unions individually. Ultimately, G.E. officials
walked out from a meeting with the International Union of Electrical Work-
ers (I.U.E.) when representatives of seven other internationals appeared, to
G.E.'s surprise, on I.U.E.'s side of the table. The NLRB declared G.E.'s
conduct to be an unfair labor practice. 51 However, White House interven-
tion finally caused G.E. to settle with the coalition.
52
Management summarized the result:
In retrospect, it seems clear that the union maneuver was a successful one....
[C]oalition bargaining was the crucial factor that transformed GE's bargaining
from a traditional unit-by-unit pattern to one that can lead more readily to na-
tional crisis bargaining, with all of the attendant trappings of a national
emergency dispute. The pressures for granting concessions mount in a negotiation
on a national scale and they were intensified in this case by the strategic im-
portance of GE as a supplier of essential defense production, not to mention the
impact of a GE strike on the economy as a whole.
53
In conclusion, the case against coordinated collective bargaining is based
on the theory that the unions are provided with the power to cripple the econ-
omy with massive strikes if their demands are not met. Moreover, it is
asserted crisis bargaining results in extorting one inflationary wage increase
after another.
D. The NLRB ruling on coordinated collective bargaining
The NLRB has, to a certain extent, upheld the legality of coordinated
collective bargaining. In October, 1968, the NLRB finally adjudged G.E.
to be in violation of the NLRA by engaging and having engaged in certain
unfair labor practices.54 For many years G.E. had negotiated a national
contract with the I.U.E. Agreement was reached through an I.U.E. con-
ference board consisting of delegates from each I.U.E. local in G.E. plants.
The conference board then elected a negotiating committee which bargained
with G.E. representatives.
I.U.E.'s initial attempt at coordinated collective bargaining, which re-
sulted in White House intervention, began in 1965, when the I.U.E. joined
with a number of other international unions who dealt with G.E. They
formed the Committee on Collective Bargaining to organize coalition bar-
gaining with G.E. The committee attempted to meet with G.E. repre-
50 Id. at 26.
51 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417 (173 N.L.R.B. No. 46).
52 Settlement was suddenly reached in order to avoid a threatened Taft-Hartley in-
junction. A White House mediation panel aided the parties in reaching their agree-
ment. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 5.
53 G. FAnmER, supra note 36, at 28-29.
54 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417, 25,419 (173 N.L.R.B.
No. 46).
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sentatives, but G.E. refused on the basis that the committee was a means
employed to engage in coalition bargaining.65
Finally, in April, 1966, the I.U.E. conference board, informed G.E. that
it was abandoning its request for joint discussions. On this basis G.E.
agreed to meet with the I.U.E. negotiating committee on May 4, 1966,
prior to the opening of formal negotiations. At the appointed time, G.E.
walked out from the bargaining session when it was discovered that the
I.U.E. had included in its negotiating committee certain non-voting mem-
bers, each wearing lapel buttons indicating they were representatives from
each of the other international unions.5c G.E. continued to refuse to
negotiate until August 18. By that time, however, the I.U.E. had filed prop-
er notice (pursuant to the provisions of the contract then in effect) of intent
to terminate the current contract and requested a meeting on August 15, 16
or 17. G.E. responded that it would meet only if the non-voting members
were not present. The NLRB Trial Examiner determined that this conduct
was in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA 57 as a refusal "to meet
with the Union both before and after bargaining was required by the col-
lective bargaining contract of the parties."58
A collateral issue to the coordinated bargaining problem concerned when,
if ever, G.E. was obligated to meet with the I.U.E. It is clear that any ac-
tion of the NLRB against G.E. for failure to meet with the I.U.E. would be
without basis if G.E. were never under any obligation to meet. On this
issue, however, both the NLRB 59 and the Second Circuit 0 held that a re-
fusal by G.E. to meet with the I.U.E. was during some period in which G.E.
was contractually obligated to bargain.01
55 Id. at 25,418.
56 Id.
.5 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). This section provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Section 159(a) provides for direct adjustment of grievances between employer and
employee as long as any agreement is not inconsistent with the collective bargaining
agreement.
68 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417, 25,419 (173 N.L.R.B.
No. 46).
59 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417 (173 N.L.R.B. No. 46).
60 General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
61 Pursuant to the contract then in effect, the parties could voluntarily enter into
negotiations prior to the date of mandatory bargaining. The NLRB held that G.E.'s
voluntary agreement to a reopening of the labor contract was not made conditional
upon the presence of only representatives of the I.U.E.
The Circuit Court, however, modified the NLRB decision on this issue. They
found G.E. had properly limited its agreement to voluntary bargaining so that it was
under no obligation at that time to meet with the I.U.E. when representatives of other
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The principal contention made by G.E. was that its walkout and refusal to
meet with the I.U.E. was justified because the union planned to engage in
coalition bargaining. G.E. was directly challenging this method of bargain-
ing as an unfair labor practice. But the NLRB refused to consider such a
broad issueC.0 2 The decision stated that the purpose of the I.U.E. could be
determined only by G.E.'s doing what it chose not to do-by staying and
bargaining in order to determine whether the I.U.E. had come to negotiate
only for its own agreement.63
The NLRB declared:
For this reason, we need not decide whether [G.E.'s] refusal to bargain might
have been justified if, in fact, the participating unions had been 'locked in' to a
conspiratorial understanding. By walking out of the May 4 meeting, [G.E.] pre-
cluded our consideration of this issue. Nor need we decide whether [G.E.] could
lawfully have suspended negotiations if, during the course of the discussions,
it became apparent that the non-TUE representatives were seeking to bargain
for their own unions, rather than for the IUE. These situations raise questions
which are not presented by the instant case. In this case, we are only called
upon to decide whether the mere presence on the T"UE Negotiating Committee of
representatives from unions other than the TUE justified [G.E.'s] refusal to
bargain, there being no evidence that these representatives bargained in bad faith
or for employees other than those represented by the TUE.64
The above quoted language, as it relates to the right of the non-I.U.E.
representatives to bargain for their own unions, is in apparent conflict with
the board's subsequent inference that G.E. would not have been guilty of an
unfair labor practice, had G.E. remained, and had the I.U.E. not come to
negotiate only for its own agreement.65 It is likely, however, that the
board did not actually intend to consider this question because its statement
regarding the effect of the I.U.E.'s not negotiating only for its own agree-
ment was dicta taken from a quotation found in an earlier case.66
In referring to Section 7 of the NLRA,6 7 the NLRB held that G.E. would
unions were present. Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit agreed that G.E. had no
such excuse for its later refusal to meet at the stipulated time for mandatory bargaining.
412 F.2d 512, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1969).
62 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417, 25,419 (173 N.L.R.B. No.
46).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 25,419-20.
65 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
66 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In this
case, the NLRB sought and obtained a temporary injunction compelling G.E. to bar-
gain with the Committee on Collective Bargaining.
67 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). This section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
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have been justified in breaking off negotiations when it did only if faced with
union representatives who were "so tainted with conflict or so patently
obnoxious as to negate the possibility of good-faith bargaining."68 This is
consonant with Section 7 because the right of employees to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing is not an absolute
right.69 But noting that if this applied to the presence of non-union per-
sonnel in a bargaining committee it would substantially limit the opportunity
for collaboration and cooperation between unions, the NLRB held:
[T]o recognize the possibility of abuse is quite different from concluding ...
that abuse is inherent in any attempt at coordinated bargaining. We do not
believe that the mere possibility of such abuse, without substantial evidence of
ulterior motive or bad faith, justifies qualification of a union's right to select the
persons who will represent it at the negotiating table.70
The NLRB, in effect, allowed coalition among unions to the limited
extent that representatives from other unions, may be present during bar-
gaining by the principal union. The NLRB was silent as to what extent, or
indeed, if the outside unions could participate in the bargaining. However,
the board did hold that G.E. could have refused to bargain with the coalition
upon a clear showing that one or more of the representatives were "so
tainted with conflict or so patently obnoxious as to negate the possibility
of good faith bargaining. '71 This would seem a difficult burden to meet.
The issue was not reached as to whether unions whose contracts expire at
the same time could join together, over the objection of management, and
compel management to bargain for one contract.
Only on a collateral issue, concerning what date G.E. had violated the
NLRA, did the Second Circuit72 disagree with the NLRB decision.78
In declaring the employees have a fundamental right to choose their own
representatives under the NLRA the court sustained the NLRB position.
But noting that there are exceptions to this right the court said:
Thus, in arguing that employees may not select members of other unions as 'repre-
sentatives of their own choosing' on a negotiating committee, the Company clearly
undertakes a considerable burden, characterized in an analogous situation in
NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968), as the showing
of a 'clear and present' danger to the collective bargaining process.
74
The court perceived many valid reasons for a union to secure aid from
outsiders. The court said: "[W]e are told a union has an interest in using
experts to bargain, whether the expertise be on technical, substantive mat-
68 General Elec. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,417, 25,420 (173 N.R.L.B.
No. 46).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 25,420-21.
71 Id. at 25,420.
72 General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
73 See note 61 supra.
74 General Elep. Co. v, NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1969).
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ters or on the general art of negotiating."75
G.E. contended that the NLRB ruling was an attempt to adjust economic
power. In rejecting this contention the court recognized that it is a normal
goal of both labor and management to increase their bargaining strength,
but that the Board's application of an old policy to a new situation is not
invalid merely because it affects bargaining positions.' 6
On the basis of these NLRB and Circuit Court decisions, a labor union
may enter the bargaining sessions accompanied by persons not affiliated
with the principal union in order to negotiate for a single contract. It is not
settled, however, whether unions may negotiate together and compel man-
agement to accept multiple contracts. Nor did the decisions focus on the
issue of whether labor unions within a conglomerate can compel the con-
glomerate to bargain with all unions at one time for a single labor contract.
E. Changes in labor relations-A remedy for conglomerate
bargaining power.
One purpose of the NLRA is to enable employees to come together and
select a committee to bargain collectively with their employer.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
77
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing .... 78
While this right is not unlimited it represents the embodiment of con-
gressional policy towards labor relations. In order to maintain this policy,
when a new development such as conglomerate growth alters the labor-
management picture, the nature of collective bargaining should evolve to pre-
serve the purpose of the Act. We must be mindful, however, that the right
of employees to come together and bargain collectively should not be imple-
mented to subordinate the rights of management.7
9
75 Id. at 518.
76 Id. at 519.
77 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
78 Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
70 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964) states:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor or-
ganizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such
commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through con-
certed activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of corn-
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Unquestionably, the conglomerate corporation presents to labor a new form
of management. This is seen in the conglomerate's diversified nature
caused by its spreading over many different industries and unions, its
potential for removal of management bargaining authority from the local
level, and the possibility of uncontrollable size. Accordingly, the collective
bargaining process should be altered so as to enable labor to bargain on a
parity with a conglomerate employer.
Labor demands the right to use coalition bargaining; management resists
any change on the grounds that this would grant labor the power to destroy
a company or the economy. Resolution of this dilemma seemingly is found
in the underlying purpose of the NLRA. Fundamentally, the Act provides
that the employees have a right to bargain together in the labor market and
sell their services to their employer.
Labor, it will be recalled, fears conglomerate management because the
conglomerate could conceivably use its diversity and size to break a strike
at one subsidiary by transferring funds from another, and remove to a
distant office all significant decision and policy making. Since in each of
these situations central management is actually managing the subsidiary by
shifting funds and formulating labor policy traditionally made by local
management, the conglomerate has arguably become the direct employer of
each subsidiary employee because it has chosen to exercise the power of
such a position. Again, the labor policy of G.E. serves as a clear example.
It is recognized that the same, or nearly the same, offer emanating from a
central source is made to each union with which G.E. deals.80
In such a case, therefore, coalition bargaining would serve to not only
protect the employees' rights, but it would also be harmonious with stated
merce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance
of the rights herein guaranteed.
80 The Second Circuit in General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir.
1969), stated:
The Company has in the past made effective use of its own ability to plan
centralized bargaining strategy in dealing with the various unions representing its
employees while keeping the actual bargaining with each union separate.
The court continued, quoting Judge Frankel in McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 690, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1966):
[Tihe practice is to formulate a set of national company proposals for presenta-
tion to the UE and the UE, two of the three unions with which there is bargain-
ing on a national scale. Before these proposals are presented to the unions, the
Company's employee relations managers are called to the New York main office,
where copies are given and explained to them. The Company then presents the
proposals to the UE and UE. Normally within a day or two thereafter * * *,
upon instructions from New York headquarters, the same proposals are given by
the local managers to the local representatives around the country of all the vary-
ing unions with which the Company deals on a so-called local basis * * *. At
the same time, and commonly before the unions have announced their acceptance
or rejection, the uniform set of proposals is publicized to the Company's employees.
This mode of centralized administration, despite the multiplicity of bargaining
units and representatives, is rendered feasible in part because the Company's col-
lective agreements, with an insignificant number of exceptions, have uniform ex-
piration dates.
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NLRA policy of allowing employees to bargain together with their employer.
On the other hand, the conglomerate could choose to not exercise these
powers over its subsidiaries and thereby eliminate the possibility that it might
be regarded as the employer of each subsidiary employee. Indeed, con-
glomerates frequently profess that their subsidiaries are autonomous."'
It follows, therefore, that if the conglomerate is merely a "paper holding"
organization there would exist no policy grounds under the NLRA to permit
the subsidiary employee to bargain with central conglomerate management.
Each subsidiary would remain the functional employer and the proper entity
under the policy of the NLRA, with whom labor should bargain.
The NLRA definition of employer is not very helpful.82 An employer,
for the purpose of labor relations policy making, should be definied as the
highest organizational entity in a business structure [excluding the organiza-
tions listed in NLRA Section 2(2)] which exercises managerial and de-
cision making powers concerning the labor force. Such a definition would
be within the spirit of the NLRA which apparently did not make provision
for the impact of the congolmerate on labor relations. Under this approach
employees could join together as they wish, regardless of union, plant or trade
distinctions and bargain collectively with their true "employer". Accordingly,
coordinated collective bargaining would be commensurate with the realities
of ownership and control. The inequities in bargaining position created by
the conglomerate structure would be eliminated and labor would not be
granted unnecessary power.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,83 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the NLRA usage of "employer" and "employee" to mean more
than the common law definitions of these terms.8 4 The Court said:
In this light, the broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject
conventional limitations on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and
"labor dispute," leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly,
in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and
exclusively by previously established legal classifications.
. . . That term [employee], like other provisions, must be understood with
reference to the purpose of the Act and the facts involved in the economic re-
lationship. 'Where all the conditions of the relation require protection, protection
ought to be given.'8 5
81 MacDonald, supra note 2, at 20.
82 National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964) provides:
The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no
part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividual, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time
to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
83 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
84 Id. at 128.
85 Id. at 129.
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Hearst was relied upon in the subsequent decision of NLRB v. E.C. Atkins
& Co.88 The Court declared that Congress, in formulating the NLRA, pur-
posely avoided delineating precise definitions for "employer" and "em-
ployee"A7 The Court further stated:
As we recognized in the Hearst case, the terms "employee" and "employer"
in this statute carry with them more than the technical and traditional common
law definitions. They also draw substance from the policy and purposes of the
Act, the circumstances and background of particular employment relationships,
and all the hard facts of industrial life.88
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of coordinated collective bargaining is recognized by
both labor and management. By the time the NLRB had issued its holding,
the parties had already negotiated a new labor contract because a federal
district court had issued a temporary injunction compelling G.E. to bargain89
and because of White House intervention. 90 Consequently, notwithstand-
ing the apparent mootness of G.E.'s prior conduct as it related to the labor
contract, 91 the issue of coordinated bargaining was considered sufficiently
important for the NLRB to issue a decision condemning G.E.'s action. The
importance of the issue is underscored by G.E.'s having appealed the de-
cision to the Second Circuit. Moreover, labor believes it obtained, because
of this method of bargaining, a more favorable contract with G.E. than
would have been possible under past methods:
Most labor sources agree that the company would not have made such an
attractive offer originally if it had not been faced with an 11-union coalition.
The company has obtained cheaper agreements in the past by negotiating with
each union separately.
92
Coordinated collective bargaining can be used to place labor in an equal
bargaining position to that of a conglomerate corporation. However, the
right to coalition bargaining would bestow additional power on the unions
and, therefore, should be limited to those instances where it is necessary to
enable labor to bargain meaningfully with its true employer. The func-
86 331 U.S. 398 (1947).
87 Id. at 403.
88 Id.
89 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
90 See note 52 supra.
91 The reaching of an acceptable contract between the parties seemingly would end
the controversy between them. However, the NLRB Trial Examiner found the issue
was not moot because G.E.'s conduct indicated that it would engage in future coordi-
nated bargaining sessions only if under compulsion to do so. Trial Examiner's Decision
at 25, General Elec. Co., Case No. 2-CA-10,991 (Oct. 23, 1968) (173 N.L.R.B. No.
46).
92 N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1966, at 34, col. 5.
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tional definition of employer should be expanded to include the distant
entity if it controls labor policy and decision making. In this manner, the
NLRA's policy of allowing employees to bargain collectively with their em-
ployer will be fulfilled even within a conglomerate corporation.
Richard Anthony Smith
